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Abstract
Indirect reciprocity based on reputation is a leading mechanism driving human cooperation,
where monitoring of behaviour and sharing reputation-related information are crucial. Because col-
lecting information is costly, a tragedy of the commons can arise, with some individuals free-riding
on information supplied by others. This can be overcome by organising monitors that aggregate
information, supported by fees from their information users. We analyse a co-evolutionary model
of individuals playing a social dilemma game and monitors watching them; monitors provide infor-
mation and players vote for a more beneficial monitor. We find that (1) monitors that simply rate
defection badly cannot stabilise cooperation—they have to overlook defection against ill-reputed
players; (2) such overlooking monitors can stabilise cooperation if players vote for monitors rather
than to change their own strategy; (3) STERN monitors, who rate cooperation with ill-reputed
players badly, stabilise cooperation more easily than MILD monitors, who do not do so; (4) a
STERN monitor wins if it competes with a MILD monitor; and (5) STERN monitors require a
high level of surveillance and achieve only lower levels of cooperation, whereas MILD monitors
achieve higher levels of cooperation with loose and thus lower cost monitoring.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The evolution of cooperation is a universal problem across species [1–3]. To achieve
cooperation, individuals often need to overcome a social dilemma: for the population, all-
out cooperation is the best, whereas for each individual, it is better to free ride on the
contributions of others [4, 5]. Indirect reciprocity, among several other mechanisms, is a
leading explanation for the evolution of human cooperation [6–10]. In indirect reciprocity,
an individual helping another will be helped in the future; cooperative individuals are highly
valued and obtain help from others because of their good reputation.
Indirect reciprocity fundamentally depends on the individuals’ ability to evaluate others
and share information about their reputation (e.g., via gossip). This requires an individual
to obtain information about the others’ reputation. However, doing so is usually costly. It
demands considerable cognitive capacity to recognise and memorise others’ past actions [11–
13]. Gossip-based information sharing is vulnerable to liars who strategically spread fake
information [14]. As a recently emerging example, electronic marketplaces are adopting
feedback mechanisms to assess each seller. However, customers often fail to submit such
feedback as this involves extra work [15–18]. Consequently, the availability and reliability
of information suffers from a tragedy of the commons [18, 19].
An important difference between a material good and information is that information
can be copied and distributed among many individuals at negligible cost (even though its
acquisition may be costly). Therefore, as Arrow wrote, ‘it does not pay that everyone
in a society acquires this information, but only a number needed to supply the necessary
services’ [20]. In human societies, such specialised servicing organisations gathering and
providing reputation information, e.g., modern credit companies and online marketplaces,
have played a major role [21, 22]. These organisations are maintained by their information
users; the users demand the supply of information and contribute fees in return. This can
be understood as a mutualism between monitoring services and information users. As far
as we know, this has not been explored in the context of indirect reciprocity.
In this study, we apply evolutionary game theory to the analysis of mutualism between
users of reputation-related information (i.e., the players) and information-providing services
(i.e., the monitors) in the context of indirect reciprocity. We present a co-evolutionary model
in which players and monitors seek to adapt their strategies through social learning. The
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population of players is engaged in a social dilemma game called the donation game; from
time to time, one player can decide whether to help another player or not. The strategy can
be unconditional: to always help, or to always refuse to help. In this case, cooperation loses
out. But players can also use a conditional strategy, and help only those players who have a
good reputation. We analyse whether competition between information providers can lead
to cooperation in the population of players.
In our evolutionary model, players can occasionally change their behaviour, which fits into
one of the afore-mentioned three types: conditional cooperation, unconditional cooperation,
or unconditional defection. The conditional cooperators are further permitted to select a
better monitor by voting; the voters display their preference for a better monitor, from
which the monitors anticipate their potential future payoff if they continue to obey the
present strategy. We shall see that a cooperative mutualism is achieved if the voters are
ready to select a better monitor in voting rather than change their behaviour in the donation
game.
A frequently-studied issue in indirect reciprocity is the evolution of moral assessment
rules which determine what kind of behaviour leads to a good reputation [10]. Well-known
assessment rules are SCORING, MILD, and STERN. The SCORING rule is the simplest
assessment rule: cooperation is good and defection is bad. Under the MILD and STERN
rules, defection against players of bad reputation (cheaters) is good. The only disagree-
ment between the MILD and STERN rules is that STERN prescribes punishing players of
bad reputation by withholding help, whereas the MILD rule leaves both cooperation and
defection options open. The SCORING rule cannot achieve stable cooperation if players
simply interact with one another in random matching games (though the SCORING rule
is also known to stabilise cooperation with some additional assumptions such as players’
growing social networks, multiple reputation states, and assortment in interactions [23–25]).
The MILD and STERN rules belong to the few that achieve stable cooperation in random
matching games [26–28].
We study the three above-mentioned assessment rules and find that SCORING moni-
tors cannot establish cooperative populations, whereas MILD and STERN monitors can.
When comparing MILD and STERN rules, we find that cooperation has a broader basin of
attraction with the STERN rule. Moreover, STERN wins when MILD and STERN mon-
itors compete. However, the MILD rule realises a more cooperative population with less
3
frequent (and hence, less costly) monitoring than the STERN rule. This slight difference
in the two assessment rules implies a trade-off: STERN is more stable, but MILD is more
efficient. MILD always wins against SCORING, but SCORING can displace STERN (and
thus subvert cooperation).
II. METHODS
Here we summarise the model by which we numerically simulate the co-evolutionary
dynamics. The derivation of the dynamics is described in more detail in the supporting
information (SI text, Sec. S1).
A. Population structure, the donation game, and the behaviour of players
We consider a large, well-mixed population of players (see Fig. 1). From time to time, the
players interact with each other in a social dilemma game called the donation game [8, 9].
In a (one-shot) donation game, two players are selected at random from the population,
and one of them, called the donor, decides whether or not to help the other, called the
recipient. These two alternatives are called cooperation (C) and defection (D), respectively.
A donor who cooperates pays a cost c (> 0) to increase the recipient’s payoff by an amount b
(> c). Each player adopts one of three strategies: unconditional cooperation, unconditional
defection, or conditional cooperation. An unconditional cooperator or defector always selects
C or D, respectively. By contrast, a conditional cooperator selects C or D depending on
whether a recipient has a good (G) or bad (B) reputation, respectively. This reputation
information comes at a price β (≥ 0).
B. Behaviour of monitors
A monitor, or information provider, asks a fee, β, for its service. It observes each inter-
action with a probability q, for which it has to pay a cost C(q) ≥ 0, and updates the record
of the player’s reputation accordingly. We assume that C(q) is a monotonically increasing
convex function such that the cost is zero with no observation and is infinite with complete
observation. The cost function is proportional to a parameter γ ≥ 0 (see SI text, Sec. S1.5).
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With probability 1−q, the monitor records fake information randomly based on the average
ratio of good and bad players in the population. For example, if 90% of the players have
a good reputation, then a faking monitor assigns a good reputation to the recipient with a
probability of 90%, irrespective of the recipient’s actual behaviour. We assume that faking
incurs no cost to the monitor.
C. Assessment rules: SCORING, MILD, and STERN
A monitor assesses the donor’s behaviour according to an assessment rule, which deter-
mines whether the donor obtains a good or a bad reputation (G or B). We consider three
assessment rules called SCORING, MILD, and STERN (see Tab. I). The SCORING rule
simply considers that cooperation and defection are good and bad, respectively, irrespective
of the recipient’s reputation. MILD and STERN rules follow the same assessment when the
recipient has a good reputation, whereas they consider that defection against bad players
is justified, i.e., a good behaviour (see D→ B column in Tab. I). The MILD and STERN
rules differ when a donor helps a bad recipient. Such a behaviour is regarded as good by the
MILD rule, whereas it is regarded as bad by the STERN rule (see C→ B column in Tab. I)
We introduce errors in the monitors’ assessments. With a small probability µ, a monitor
may assign a reputation opposite to that intended. Moreover, we assume that all players
have a good reputation to begin with.
D. Social learning among players
We study the co-evolution of players and monitors by combining pairwise comparison and
adaptive dynamics, both well established techniques in evolutionary game theory [29, 30].
The players gradually change the relative frequencies of their strategies, denoted by
(xC, xD, xR), where the subscripts denote unconditional cooperators (C), unconditional de-
fectors (D), and conditional cooperators (R, for ‘reciprocators’). Their evolution is driven
by an imitation process based on a pairwise payoff comparison with random exploration,
given by
x˙σ = 
[
1
3
− xσ
]
+ (1− )xσ
∑
σ′
xσ′ tanh
[w
2
(piσ − piσ′)
]
(1)
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for each strategy σ ∈ {C,D,R}, where piσ represents the payoffs of players obeying strat-
egy σ (see SI text, Sec. S1.4 for its derivation). The first term of the right-hand side of
Eq. (1) represents random exploration; with a small probability , the players explore dif-
ferent strategies in a uniformly random manner. The second term of the right-hand side
of Eq. (1) represents imitation based on a pairwise payoff comparison; with a probabil-
ity 1 − , a randomly selected player compares her payoff and another randomly selected
player’s payoff, and imitate the latter player’s strategy with a probability given by a sigmoid
function, 1/ [1 + exp(−w∆)], where ∆ is the payoff difference [31]. Equation (1) is tuned
by a parameter w > 0, which represents the speed with which players switch to a better
strategy [31].
E. Voting between monitors and their adaptive dynamics
The monitors’ evolution is driven by voting by their clients (i.e., conditional cooperators).
We assume for simplicity that only two monitors, denoted by 1 and 2, are competing. Most
of the time, the two monitors behave alike. Occasionally, one monitor (monitor 1) slightly
changes the parameter values from (q, β) to (q′, β′) at random. The clients of the monitors
compare their payoffs, which are different between the two monitors, and ‘vote with their
hands’ on which monitor is better. That is, the clients show the monitors how many of them
will move to a better monitor, given by
x′Ri
xR
=
eαpi
′
Ri
eαpi
′
R1 + eαpi
′
R2
(2)
for monitor i ∈ {1, 2}, if the monitors continue to use the slightly-changed parameter values
(i.e., (q, β) and (q′, β′). Here, x′Ri/xR is the frequency of clients that vote for monitor i
(numerator) relative to the total frequency of clients (denominator) and pi′Ri represents the
payoff of clients that use monitor i. Moreover, the parameter α > 0 represents how strongly
the clients vote for the monitor whose clients do better. This parameter corresponds to how
nimbly the monitors evolve their parameters. On receiving the results of the voting, a less
popular monitor, who will lose some clients in the future if it continues to use the present
parameter values, will quickly follow suit and adopt the more popular monitor’s parameter
values. This process can be modelled by adaptive dynamics (see SI text, Sec. S1.5) [32].
The voting is assumed to be much faster than the change in the player’s behaviour from
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conditional to unconditional cooperation or defection.
III. RESULTS
A. The SCORING rule cannot stabilise cooperation
When both monitors adopt the SCORING rule, the system cannot reach stable cooper-
ation, even if the initial population of players consists entirely of conditional cooperators.
Figure 2(a) displays a typical example of the failure of the SCORING rule. The frequency of
monitoring, i.e., of xR and of q, first increases. Then, because the SCORING rule does not
distinguish defection against bad players from defection against good players (i.e., so-called
justified defection), the fraction of good conditional cooperators decreases rapidly, as shown
by the decrease of the frequency of cooperation in Fig. 2(a). This implies that monitoring
harms the population in the case of the SCORING rule, so that the frequency of monitoring
begins to decrease. Finally, monitoring vanishes and unconditional defectors invade and take
over.
B. STERN and MILD rules can stabilise cooperation if voters strongly support a
beneficial monitor
When the monitors adopt the MILD or STERN rule, they can secure stable cooperation
supported by frequent monitoring, provided the initial fraction of conditional cooperators is
sufficiently large (Fig. 2(b–e)). Interestingly, this mutualism between conditional coopera-
tors and monitors is achieved even if the initial frequency of monitoring is zero, i.e., q = 0. A
bootstrapping process allows the monitoring frequency to quickly increase (see Fig. 2(c,e)).
What controls this growth of monitoring is the intensity with which players select a
better monitor in voting (i.e., α) relative to that with which they change their own strategy
(i.e., w). We numerically find the minimum fraction of conditional cooperators (i.e., the
minimum xR) needed to establish a stable mutualism for various values of α and w (Fig. 3).
In the case of the SCORING rule, as expected, the monitors cannot sustain their monitoring
frequency even if the population consists entirely of conditional cooperators (Fig. 3(a,d)).
For the MILD and the STERN rules, we find that stable mutualism can be reached if α
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is sufficiently large (Fig. 3(b,c,e,f)); a strong competition between monitors is essential.
Moreover, the required initial fraction of conditional cooperators decreases as w becomes
smaller, provided that the benefit-to-cost ratio of cooperation (i.e., b/c) is sufficiently large
(Fig. 3(e,f)). These two observations together imply that if the voters (i.e., conditional
cooperators) select monitors faster than they switch strategies, then the monitors are forced
to establish reliable monitoring, and thereby the users enjoy a cooperative society supported
by the monitoring system.
C. The STERN rule establishes cooperation more easily than the MILD rule
Furthermore, we observe a difference between MILD and STERN; the region leading to a
cooperative mutualism is larger under the STERN rule than under the MILD rule (compare
Fig. 3(b,e) and Fig. 3(c,f)). The intensity of competition between monitors (i.e., α) required
to reach the cooperative equilibria is larger with the MILD rule than with the STERN rule.
That is, with a STERN assessment, the system can more easily succeed in establishing the
mutualism, even when the competition between the monitors is relatively weak.
D. STERN is dominant if STERN and MILD rules compete
So far, we have assumed that the two monitors adopt the same assessment rule. What
if different assessment rules compete? Let us assume that, after a long time over which the
two monitors use the same assessment rule, one of them adopts a different rule, but both
monitors still use the same parameters q and β. We can easily see that the payoff to the
STERN monitor is always higher than that to the MILD monitor (see SI text, Sec. S2). This
is because conditional cooperators using the STERN monitor’s information (STERN users)
gain relatively higher payoffs than those using the MILD monitor (MILD users); when they
interact, MILD users cooperate more with STERN users, whereas STERN users cooperate
less with MILD users [33]. Thus, STERN is again more robust than MILD, in the sense of
the competition between the two assessment rules [33, 34].
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E. The STERN rule achieves lower cooperation with severe surveillance, whereas
the MILD rule achieves higher cooperation with loose monitoring
Given a population that has established a stable mutualism, it is interesting to see whether
monitoring is severe or not and how cooperative the players are. To study this, we numer-
ically observe the equilibrium states of populations varying in the benefit-to-cost ratio of
cooperation in the donation game (i.e., b/c) and in the ratio between monitoring cost and
cooperation cost (i.e., γ/c) under the two assessment rules MILD and STERN. The charac-
teristics of equilibria under the three assessment rules differ qualitatively with respect to the
frequency of monitoring (Fig. 4(a,b,c)) and the cooperativeness of the players (Fig. 4(d,e,f)).
In the case of the SCORING rule, again, the monitors cannot increase their monitoring fre-
quency and the players fail to establish cooperative populations (Fig. 4(a,d)). In contrast,
MILD and STERN rules succeed in establishing cooperative populations under a wide range
of parameter settings (Fig. 4(b,c,e,f)). The equilibrium frequencies of monitoring under
MILD and STERN rules are the same (100%) when monitoring is cost free (i.e., when
γ = 0; see the left edges of the panels in Fig. 4(a,b)). When monitoring is costly (i.e.,
when γ > 0), one might expect that the frequency of monitoring would diminish as the cost
increases. This prediction is verified for the MILD rule (Fig. 4(a)), but fails for the STERN
rule (Fig. 4(b)); in the latter case, information users still need accurate information although
the cost of monitoring is large.
Why does this happen? Consider that two STERN monitors have conflicting opinions
about a player’s reputation; one monitor (monitor 1) regards the player (player A) as good
but the other monitor (monitor 2) regards the player as bad. In a donation game, a donor
(player B, a conditional cooperator) is informed about player A’s reputation by, say, monitor
1. Player B helps player A, because player A has a good reputation according to monitor
1. In this situation, monitor 1 assigns a good reputation to player B, because the monitor
thinks that the game is in the C→ G scenario (see Tab. I). However, monitor 2 assigns
a bad reputation to player B, because it thinks that the game is in the C→ B scenario.
In this process, the existence of player A, who has conflicting reputations in the eyes of
the two monitors, yields another player who also has conflicting reputations. Thus the
number of players with conflicting reputation inexorably grows [35]. As a consequence,
the degree of cooperation under the STERN rule becomes significantly smaller than that
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under the MILD rule (Fig. 4(e,f)). To avoid mistakenly cooperating with players that have
conflicting reputations, conditional cooperators need accurate information and require severe
surveillance under the STERN rule.
Another difference between MILD and STERN rules is that in case of the MILD rule, as
the cost of monitoring increases, the minimum benefit-to-cost ratio (i.e., b/c) required for
sustaining mutualism becomes larger, whereas in the case of the STERN rule, it does not
change (compare Fig. 4(b,e) with Fig. 4(c,f)). Mutualism under the STERN rule is easier
to establish than under the MILD rule, as previously shown in Fig. 3.
Finally, we mention that if a SCORING monitor competes with a STERN monitor (both
having the same (q, β)-values), then it may happen that SCORING wins, thus subverting
cooperation (see SI text, Sec. S3). This holds if the number of unconditional defectors is
sufficiently high. It follows that under certain conditions, we encounter a rock-paper-scissors
type of competition for the three assessment rules: SCORING beats STERN, MILD beats
SCORING, and STERN beats MILD.
F. Robustness checks
For the results of comparisons between different initial states of players (i.e., (xC, xD, xR))
and different shapes of the cost function for monitoring (i.e., C(q)), see the SI text, Secs. S3
and S4, respectively. Neither consideration changes our results qualitatively. In a few
parameter sets unde the MILD rule, we observed stable periodic oscillations (see the SI
text, Sec. S6 for detail).
IV. DISCUSSION
We have studied a co-evolutionary model of indirect reciprocity in which players request
information about reputations and monitors supply it. Thus players and monitors mutually
benefit from using and providing information. We compared three different assessment rules
called SCORING, MILD and STERN, and found that only the MILD and STERN rules
can establish a cooperative mutualism. We confirmed that the SCORING rule fails to foster
cooperation (Sec. III A). Mutualism can emerge and be stabilised in the case of the MILD or
STERN rule if the initial frequency of conditional cooperators is sufficiently high and if they
10
strongly support a better monitor rather than rapidly changing their strategy; the slow speed
of evolution of players’ strategy relative to that of monitors’ is important (Sec. III B). The
STERN and the MILD rules differ in their stability. The STERN rule is more robust than
the MILD rule in admitting a larger basin of attraction leading to cooperation (Sec. III C).
The intensity of competition between monitors (i.e., α) can be smaller in case of the STERN
rule than in the case of the MILD rule. The STERN rule is more robust than the MILD
rule in another sense: the competition between two monitors, one STERN and one MILD,
always leads to victory by the STERN rule (Sec. III D). Moreover, the difference between
the MILD and the STERN rules substantially affects the outcome of co-evolution. With
MILD monitors, players achieve more cooperative states under less-frequent monitoring,
whereas with STERN monitors, players achieve less cooperative states and are under severe
surveillance, i.e., q ≈ 1 (Sec. III E). However, cooperative mutualism can be more easily
obtained with STERN monitors than with MILD monitors in the sense that the cost-to-
benefit ratio and the cost for monitoring can be larger.
In evolutionary studies of symbiosis, the so-called Red Queen’s hypothesis is often in-
voked. It says that competing species are exposed to arms races and therefore those evolving
faster are advantaged [36, 37]. However, recent theoretical studies have found that some-
times the species evolving slowly can win. This is called the Red King effect [38, 39]. In
the Red King effect, immobility can be a form of commitment that obliges other species to
give way. In the present study, a similar effect enables a stable mutualism between players
and monitors; players are the hosts that evolve slowly and promote the monitors’ costly
monitoring.
Several works in economics have studied repeated games with costly monitoring of op-
ponents’ actions [21, 40–42]. These studies focused on the individual trade-off between the
value of information and the cost of its acquisition and did not consider how to promote
costly sharing of information among individuals. Gazzale presented a model of seller–buyer
transaction in which buyers can report information about sellers to a rating system and
their reporting is visible by sellers, and Gazzale and Khopkar experimentally studied how
this mechanism promotes costly sharing of information [15, 16]. In their model, a buyer’s
costly reporting of information about a seller builds the buyer’s reputation as an information
spreader. This increases the effort level of the buyer’s future partners afraid of receiving a
bad reputation, and thus buyers have an incentive to report information even if it is costly to
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do so. In our model, instead, monitors make an effort because by doing so their information
users reward them.
The above-mentioned studies did not assume that the reported information may be fake
and that deceivers who shirk costly monitoring gain more than serious information providers.
This problem of spreading false information about reputations was, as far as we know, first
studied in biology by Nakamaru and Kawata [14]. In their study, a ‘conditional advisor’ was
capable of detecting and suppressing free-riding liars. This is a strategy by which a player
(player A) spreads reputation information about others, which is received from another
player (player B) only when B had previously cooperated with A. The conditional advisor
strategy, therefore, needs a large amount of information acquisition for the verification of
reputation information. In contrast, our model does not require individuals to verify their
information; they only need to select a more beneficial monitor. This implies that informa-
tion users can trust information providers more easily when the providers are exposed to
competition with each other.
Rockenbach and Sadrieh conducted a behavioural experiment on the subject of costly
information spreading [18]. They demonstrated that people tend to share helpful informa-
tion with others even if reporting it provides no individual benefit. Such an instinct for the
acquisition and sharing of information could evolve if it is usually rewarded [19]. In our
model, we assumed that all individuals including players and monitors are only motivated
by self-interest. We demonstrated theoretically that the reward for reporting helpful infor-
mation can overcome the problem of costly information acquisition, even if individuals have
no social preferences other than pure self-interest.
The present study is restricted to a simple model, and the following extensions would
provide further insights. First, we studied competition between two monitors only, rather
than between many. In real life, situations with more than two competitors are common,
and ‘hub’ individuals with huge numbers of connections on social networks are observed [43].
Whether a hub information provider emerges from competition among many monitors or
not is an interesting question. Second, we assumed that when monitors fail to engage
in costly observation, they deceive client players by faking random information. In real
life, such falsification might be strategic; for example, monitors might be corrupted by
players offering them money for reporting a good reputation [17]. Third, we showed that
the competition between monitors driven by their clients’ voting ‘by hands’ rather than ‘by
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feet’ enables cooperation; clients only show their preference over monitors under voting by
hands, whereas they actually move to a better monitor under voting by feet. This is in
contrast to most studies of evolutionary dynamics, which typically assume voting by feet.
If monitors compete under voting by feet, it seems likely that one monitor could take the
entire of the clients, even if they used the same parameters. Therefore, it is important to
study whether cooperation emerges if clients vote with their feet as well as the difference
between the two types of voting. Fourth, our model assumed that social learning among
players occurs in a well-mixed manner, i.e., that the population does not have structure.
However, it could be the case that a population has a structure; people may learn from
their neighbours [44]. In that case, cooperation might be established even if the initial
fraction of conditional cooperators is smaller than that in the present result (see Fig. 3).
This is because a structure increases clustering of players having the same strategy and helps
cooperation[45]. Fifth, in our model, we only introduced errors in the monitors’ assessments,
which yielded conflicting opinions about a player’s reputation and thus players under the
STERN rule were less cooperative than those under the MILD rule. To introduce other
types of errors, e.g., errors in each player’s perception about reputation-related information,
increases such conflicting opinions and therefore it could reduce cooperation more.
An important characteristic of human behaviour is the ability to establish large-scale
cooperation [46]. Such large-scale cooperation partially depends upon the development of
large-scale information sharing, which suffers from a tragedy of the commons. As we have
discussed, one possibility for overcoming this dilemma is to introduce competition between
information sharing systems. We hope that this study helps to build understanding of
sustainable mechanisms for information provision under indirect reciprocity.
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FIG. 1: Schematic overview of the model. We consider donation games among three types of
players: unconditional cooperators, unconditional defectors, and conditional cooperators. Uncondi-
tional cooperators always cooperate (C), unconditional defectors always defect (D), and conditional
cooperators cooperate and defect towards recipients with good and bad reputations, respectively.
The reputation information thus required by conditional cooperators is provided to them by mon-
itors in exchange for a fee. To allow for competition among different monitoring strategies, we
consider two monitors who independently observe the players (at a cost to the observing monitor)
and provide reputation information accordingly (at a cost to the requesting conditional cooperator).
Monitors differ in the fractions of players they observe and in the fees they charge for providing
information. A monitor asked for reputation information about a player who was not observed
provides a random answer, and each conditional cooperator selects either one of the two monitors
by comparing the resultant long-term payoffs obtained by the monitor’s clients.
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FIG. 2: Failures and successes in the bootstrapping of institutionalised monitoring.
Bootstrapping occurs when a group without any monitoring gradually evolves to exhibit stable
and finite levels of monitoring and cooperation. Panels show how the frequencies of unconditional
cooperators, unconditional defectors, and conditional cooperators (blue, red, and green curves,
respectively), as well as those of monitoring (by monitors; cyan curve) and of cooperation (by
unconditional or conditional cooperators; black curve) evolve from different initial conditions. (a)
With the SCORING rule, bootstrapping always fails, even for groups initially comprised entirely
of conditional cooperators. (b) With the MILD rule, bootstrapping fails if the initial frequency
of conditional cooperators is too low (inside the green band). (c) With the MILD rule, boot-
strapping succeeds if the initial frequency of conditional cooperators is high enough (outside of
the green band). (d) With the STERN rule, bootstrapping fails if the initial frequency of condi-
tional cooperators is too low (inside the green band). (e) With the STERN rule, bootstrapping
succeeds if the initial frequency of conditional cooperators is high enough (outside of the green
band). Within one unit of time, on average, the reputations of all players are updated. The time
axes are scaled logarithmically to show short-term and long-term changes together. Parameters:
w = 0.01, α = 10, µ = 0.1,  = 0.001, γ = 0.01, κ = 2, c = 1, and b = 10. Initial conditions:
q = 0, β = 0, xC = 0, xD = 1− xR, and xR = 1 (a), xR = 0.3 (b, d), or xR = 0.5 (c, e).
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FIG. 3: The bootstrapping of institutionalised monitoring is facilitated by slowly evolv-
ing players and nimbly adapting monitors. Bootstrapping occurs when a group without any
monitoring gradually evolves to exhibit stable and finite levels (larger than 10%) of monitoring
and cooperation. Panels show how the minimum fraction of conditional cooperators required for
bootstrapping changes with the intensity w of imitation among players and the intensity α of com-
petition between monitors. Higher intensities imply faster adaptation. Low thresholds facilitating
bootstrapping are shown in green, and high thresholds impeding bootstrapping are shown in red.
Fully red colouration indicates that bootstrapping is impossible. (a,b,c) Low benefit-to-cost ratio
of cooperation, b/c = 5. (d,e,f) High benefit-to-cost ratio of cooperation, b/c = 10. (a,d) The
SCORING rule. (b,e) The MILD rule. (c, f) The STERN rule. Under the SCORING rule, the
frequency of monitoring always declines to 0, so institutionalised monitoring cannot be established.
Under the MILD and the STERN rules, bootstrapping is possible and is easiest, i.e., requires the
least frequency of conditional cooperators, when players adapt slowly and monitors adapt quickly.
Parameters: µ = 0.1,  = 0.001, γ = 0.01, κ = 2, and c = 1. Initial conditions: q = 0, β = 0, xC = 0,
and xD = 1− xR.
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FIG. 4: The MILD rule establishes higher cooperation while requiring only loose
surveillance, whereas the STERN rule establishes lower cooperation while requir-
ing severe surveillance. Panels show how the equilibrium frequencies of (a,b,c) monitoring and
(d,e,f) cooperation vary with the ratio γ/c between observation cost and cooperation cost and the
benefit-to-cost ratio b/c of cooperation. (a,d) The SCORING rule. (b,e) The MILD rule. (c,f)
The STERN rule. Under the SCORING rule, the frequency of monitoring always declines to 0,
so institutionalised monitoring cannot be established. Under the MILD rule, monitor evolution
equilibrates at infrequent monitoring (loose surveillance) while enabling high frequencies of coop-
eration. Under the STERN rule, monitor evolution equilibrates at frequent monitoring (severe
surveillance) while enabling only intermediate frequencies of cooperation. In comparison with the
MILD rule, the STERN rule is more robust against increasing the ratio γ/c between observation
cost and cooperation cost. Parameters: w = 0.01, α = 100, µ = 0.1,  = 0.001, κ = 2, and c = 1.
Initial conditions: q = 0, β = 0, xC = 0, xD = 0, and xR = 1.
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Tables
TABLE I: Assessment rules. When observing a donation game, each monitor assigns a rep-
utation, either good (G) or bad (B), to the participating donor according to an assessment rule
(SCORING, MILD, or STERN). These assessment rules differ in the four social scenarios: C→ G,
D→ G, D→ B, and C→ B. In the C→ G scenario, a donor cooperates with a good recipient,
in the D→ G scenario, a donor defects against a good recipient, in the D→ B scenario, a donor
defects against a bad recipient, and in the C→ B scenario, a donor cooperates with a bad recipient.
In the table, each cell represents the reputation that the donor receives in each scenario under the
two assessment rules. The SCORING rule regards cooperating (C→ G and C→ B) donors as good
and defecting (D→ G and D→ B) donors as bad. The MILD and the STERN rules are the same
except for the cell C→ B; they regard the donor in this scenario as good and bad, respectively.
Assessment rule
Social scenario
C→ G D→ G D→ B C→ B
SCORING Good Bad Bad Good
MILD Good Bad Good Good
STERN Good Bad Good Bad
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